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ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION, JUDICIAL
REVIEW, AND THE GLOOMY WORLD
OF JUDGE SMITH
RONALD M. LEvIN*
The diurnal cycle of administrative law metaphors moves steadily
forward: first came "government in the sunshine," then "sunset" laws,
and now the "twilight of administrative law." But have we really
reached the end of the day for the fundamental assumptions on which
our system of government rests? Judge Loren A. Smith's argument to
that effect' weaves together an interesting body of historical, theoretical,
and practical learning. His essay provides an apt occasion for serious
reflection on the developing corpus of principles that we call administra-
tive law. Not everyone, however, will reach conclusions as somber as
his.
Judge Smith maintains that our constitutional system is in trouble
because of "judicialization." Administrative lawyers have, he believes,
been influenced too much by their high regard for the judiciary and its
methods. He asserts that this pervasive attitude has led to three undesir-
able trends.2 First, agencies have too frequently been forced to use for-
mal procedures derived from the model of a courtroom trial. Second,
agencies have been forced to accommodate the interests of too many
players in the regulation game; the result is that some agencies' proceed-
ings have become inordinately complex.3 Third, agencies have been
forced to share policymaking power with judges, whose review of the
merits of administrative actions has become too intrusive.
This comment focuses on the third of these claims. I will contend
that searching and serious judicial review of the substance of administra-
tive actions-a phenomenon sometimes known as "hard look" review4-
* Professor of Law, Washington University. Professors Mathew McCubbins and Barry
Weingast may claim credit for, while avoiding blame for, many of the "public choice" ideas in Part
II of this comment.
1. Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 427.
2. See id. at 428-29.
3. I do not see why Judge Smith characterizes the increasing complexity of the administrative
process as part of a trend toward "judicialization." It is unclear that court proceedings, as a group,
are more complicated than agency proceedings. I will not expand on my doubts here, however,
because this aspect of Judge Smith's critique is not the subject of this comment.
4. See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416,451-52 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (chronicling
the changing connotations of the phrase "hard look").
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is, on the whole, a durable and legitimate feature of the current scene.
My argument does not mean that all reversals of agency actions are well
founded, nor even that the case law as a whole shows as much deference
as one might desire. Judge Smith's critique of judicial review is valid up
to a point. But judicial review also has virtues that Judge Smith scarcely
acknowledges, if at all. My purpose here is to evaluate his criticisms and
to present what may be a more balanced perspective on the relationship
between courts and agencies.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW DOCTRINE AND THE SMITH CRITIQUE
A. The Complexity of "Decisions of Will. "
At the heart of Judge Smith's essay is a distinction between two
types of government action: "decisions of will" and "decisions of logic."' 5
Into the first category, he says, fall decisions that might also be termed
political, democratic, or policy decisions.6 They "typically are subjec-
tive. There is often no 'right' answer to the problem calling for such a
decision. A classic, albeit homely [sic], example is whether the fence
around the city hall should be painted blue or white. We summarize this
concept by the term 'discretion.' "7 The second category, "decisions of
logic," refers to governmental choices that can be made on an objective
basis, such as whether a given individual has reached the legally desig-
nated voting age. These decisions may also, according to Judge Smith,
be termed "legal" or "judicial" decisions.8
Judge Smith believes that it is simply unjudicial for courts to in-
volve themselves in decisions of will. Indeed, they are "constitutionally
bound to disclaim [such a] role."9 Decisions of will call for creativity like
that of a scientist or engineer, he says; the reasoning processes of the
courts, in contrast, are geared toward restraining human conduct
through legal norms. "The courts, . . unlike the executive or legislative
branches, can act only within the mode of law.... Thus, while political
bodies have the potential to be creative, courts must always be instru-
ments of restraint. The judicial function begins where the democrati-
cally-controlled process of policy formation ends."10 This sense of the
fundamental illegitimacy of judicial policymaking figures prominently in
Judge Smith's conclusion that administrative law is entering a "twilight"
phase. He looks forward to a "dawn" in which the constitutional func-
5. Smith, supra note 1, at 430.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 429.
10. Id. at 445.
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tions of the three branches of our government will have been rethought. '1
In a sound constitutional order, he suggests, the courts would be far less
active.12
Judge Smith's antithesis between "decisions of will" and "decisions
of logic" is, I believe, the source of many of the difficulties with his analy-
sis. The concept of a "decision of will" carries at least a mild implication
that when an agency must choose from among a wide range of policy
options, it ought to be free to ignore "legalistic" or "judicial" modes of
thought entirely. Judge Smith does, to be sure, mention an "inevitable
overlap" between the realms of will and logic.13 Even with that qualifica-
tion, however, his terminology fosters an image of two basically discrete
categories of agency action.
In my view, this picture obscures the complexity of what we mean
by discretionary administrative authority. The vast majority of agency
actions fall into an intermediate zone in which both "will" and "logic"
have roles to play. In other words, in the typical case Congress has
granted officials some room to maneuver, but still expects that the ulti-
mate agency action will constitute a good-faith application of criteria
found in the authorizing statute. 14 Even largely discretionary decisions,
therefore, will typically entail the sort of "logical" reasoning that a court
potentially could evaluate.
Admittedly, the alternative model that I have just outlined does not
describe all administrative actions, such as those which are products of
inherent executive authority15 or which are, in the technical language of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), "committed to agency discre-
tion by law." 16 When Judge Smith refers to decisions of will, however,
he does not seem to be referring only to these narrow classes of cases.
Rather, he seems to have in mind a much wider universe of situations-
ones in which an agency simply is operating under a broad grant of dis-
11. Id. at 466.
12. See id. at 465 ("[SJubstantive judicial activism can be traced to the lack of a coherent and
generally accepted theory on the limits and functions of the administrative state.") (emphasis in
original).
13. Id. at 430.
14. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 555-56 (1965).
15. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 435 U.S. 654, 678-88 (1981) (discussing President's author-
ity to suspend private claims against foreign governments as incident to resolution of foreign policy
dispute).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 410 (1971) (section 701(a)(2) applies "in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such
broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply' "). Even in the absence of statutory
constraints, however, abuse-of-discretion review remains feasible (although the Court has been reluc-
tant to acknowledge as much). See 5 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28:8 (2d ed.
1984).
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cretionary authority. It is unhealthy to assume, even as a theoretical
starting point, that agencies that possess such a grant should generally be
free to behave exactly as they please. 17
Given that decisions of will ordinarily call for an exercise of reason-
ing from considerations prescribed by statute, one can readily discern
two ways in which courts might evaluate these decisions. They could
inquire whether the agency correctly understood the statutory premises,
and also whether the agency reasoned from them in an acceptable man-
ner. Of course, both types of inquiries are common in prevailing prac-
tice. They are known more familiarly as legal review and abuse-of-
discretion review. The remainder of this section will suggest that each
has a legitimate role to play. This discussion, obviously, will be ex-
tremely compressed; the reader who is interested in a detailed examina-
tion of current doctrines on the scope of judicial review of administrative
action will have to look elsewhere.18
B. Legal Issues.
At the very least, an agency's possession of broad discretionary au-
thority should not shield its rules and orders from being reviewed for
errors of law. 19 The easiest case, conceptually speaking, arises when an
agency action is alleged to be ultra vires on its face.20 In fact, a case of
this sort approaches what Judge Smith calls a "decision of logic," be-
17. Even in the "classic" example that Judge Smith uses to exemplify the decision of will-
"whether the fence around the city hall should be painted blue or white," Smith, supra note 1, at
430-the administrator's choice could conceivably be constrained by "aesthetic zoning" laws. See
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (dictum) ("It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy .... ); Maher v. City of New
Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1054 & n.5, 1061 (5th Cir. 1975) (sustaining ordinance that imposed color
and other restrictions on structures in historic district), cert denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976); City of
Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 419, 389 P.2d 13, 19 (1964) (same).
18. The ABA Section of Administrative Law, in a project with which I was associated, has
recently completed action on a "restatement" of doctrines in this area. See Levin, Scope-of-Review
Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 AD. L. REv. 239 (1986) [hereinafter
Restatement Report].
19. The following discussion emphasizes judicial review of alleged breaches of statutes, but the
analysis of review for other errors of law would be similar. Presumably, for example, Judge Smith
would acknowledge the permissibility of review for constitutional violations. Cf Smith, supra note
1, at 428 n.2 (citing literature on proper use of Constitution).
20. For examples of agency actions set aside as ultra vires on their face, see Board of Governors
v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986) (Federal Reserve Board has no authority over "non-
bank banks"); Lowe v. SEC, 105 S. Ct. 2557, 2571 (1985) (Investment Advisers Act does not author-
ize SEC to enjoin regular distribution of investment advice by disinterested newsletter publisher);
Public Serv. Comm'n v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co., 463 U.S. 319, 338 (1983) (FERC lacked authority
under Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 to exclude pipeline production from statutory pricing
scheme).
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cause the challenger's claim, in effect, is that the statute gave the agency
absolutely no discretion to adopt the rule or order in question.
As suggested by the discussion above, however, the inquiry into fa-
cial validity does not exhaust the court's function in reviewing for errors
of law. Thoughtful commentators have long emphasized 2' that one inte-
gral aspect of this function is to determine whether the agency acted
without using the analytical framework prescribed by Congress.22 For
example, a few years ago the Court read the Occupational Safety and
Health Act to require that federal regulations governing toxic substances
in the workplace must be set at the highest level of protection that is
technologically and economically feasible; thus, if OSHA were to choose
a level of protection for a given substance by employing an ad hoc cost-
benefit analysis, its rule would be invalid.23
Now, while one might disagree with the Court's construction of the
Act,24 it is difficult to see why this type of judicial oversight should be
considered an illegitimate intrusion upon agency autonomy-even
though OSHA's safety rules are to a very considerable degree "decisions
of will." The reviewing court's inquiry is simply a sophisticated form of
statutory construction. To be sure, much case law urges courts to give
weight to an agency's views on the meaning of the statute it enforces.25
Ultimately, however, statutory interpretation is usually considered a ju-
dicial responsibility in administrative law, just as in all other realms of
our legal system.26
21. See G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 96-98 (1924); L. JAFFE, supra
note 14, at 181-82; Byse, The Availability and Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Action by
Ordinary Courts, in LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION 543, 564-67 (J. Hazard & W. Wagner eds. 1974); Stem, Review of Findings ofAdmin-
istrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 105 (1944).
22. For examples of agency actions set aside because the agency failed to follow the analysis
prescribed by Congress, see NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. 3045, 3056-57
(1985) (Board incorrectly considered extra-unit effects of work preservation agreements in evaluat-
ing their validity); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (SEC used incorrect test in determining
whether tippee was liable for insider trading); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petro-
leum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642-46 (1980) (plurality opinion) (OSHA failed to make statutorily re-
quired finding that toxic substances to be regulated created a "significant risk").
23. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 506-22 (1981) (construing Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1980)).
24. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 667-71
(1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (rejecting the view Court later adopted in American Textile Mfrs.
Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981)).
25, See, eg., FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1931, 1938-39 (1986); FEC v. Demo-
cratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981).
26. The courts' use of substantially independent judgment in reviewing agencies' statutory in-
terpretations is defended on the basis of the Constitution in Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in
Administrative Law, 74 Gao. L.J. 1, 16-22 (1985); Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative
State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983). These analyses answer, at least to some extent, what Judge
[Vol. 1986:258
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Actually, Judge Smith does not directly challenge these convention-
ally accepted principles. Instead, he focuses on background forces that,
in his view, tend to convert the courts' role as statutory interpreters in
regulatory cases into a policymaking role. Much of the blame, he thinks,
rests with Congress, which "has contributed to the limiting of agency
discretion... [by] granting ... broad substantive mandates to the agen-
cies to fulfill their statutory purposes. ' 27 He admits that this claim is
paradoxical, but goes on to explain that gaps left by the legislature will be
filled by the courts: "Judicial review becomes far more important in de-
fining the direction and meaning of a statute when that statute sets out
vague and possibly self-contradictory mandates to an agency, rather than
clear or simple directives that leave little room for any judicial doubt as
to the agency's mission.'"28 Congress's broad statutory mandates thus
encourage courts to become "arbiters ... of agency policy direction." 29
Read at face value, Judge Smith's discussion is fallacious, because it
incorrectly equates statutory breadth with statutory vagueness, or ambi-
guity. After all, a regulatory mandate can be broad without being ambig-
uously worded. When this is the case, the courts-at least
theoretically-must respect the legislature's desire to give the agency
sweeping authority.30 Of course, no one has found a foolproof way to
prevent judges from imposing their value preferences under the pretense
of statutory interpretation;31 but it is ambiguity, not breadth, that creates
the potential for "judicial legislation." Indeed, ambiguity can certainly
exist even when the authority that a statutory provision has granted is
basically ministerial.32
It may be, however, that in the passage under examination Judge
Smith is not addressing "statutory interpretation" in a strict sense. This
hypothesis draws support from the fact that this passage introduces his
discussion of the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Motor Vehicle Manu-
Smith perceives as a "need to sort out anew the constitutional powers of the branches of the federal
government." Smith, supra note 1, at 466.
27. Smith, supra note 1, at 452.
28. Id. (footnote omitted).
29. Id.
30. See Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REv. 505, 558-60 (1985).
31. Suspicions that judicial review of administrative action is fundamentally "result-oriented"
remain prevalent. See, eg., Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 Tax. L.
REV. 207, 239 (1984); Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REv. 447, 478-79 (1986). For
a firm denial from one of the alleged manipulators, see Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning
the "Politics" of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D. C. Circuit, 56 U. CoLO. L. REv. 619
(1985).
32. See, eg., United States v. Locke, 105 S. Ct. 1785, 1789-91 (1985) (ambiguity in statute
prescribing filing deadline); Heckler v. Turner, 105 S. Ct. 1138, 1144 (1985) (ambiguity in statutory
formula for calculating eligibility for AFDC benefits).
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facturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.3 3
In State Farm the Court overturned the decision of the National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to rescind a regulation re-
quiring automobile companies to install "passive restraints"-either
airbags or automatic seatbelts-in newly manufactured cars. The deci-
sion turned on an application of abuse-of-discretion doctrine, not statu-
tory interpretation. Thus, Judge Smith's real complaint may be that
broad statutes foster judicial policymaking because they leave so much
room for courts to use abuse-of-discretion review to overturn agency de-
cisions of will. If this is what he means, his warning has some substance
and requires examination in a different context.
C. Abuse of Discretion Review.
Few would argue that the manner in which an agency exercises its
discretionary power should receive no judicial scrutiny at all. After all,
the Congress that enacted the APA must have meant something when it
directed reviewing courts to set aside not only those agency actions
which violate statutory rights,34 but also those which are "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."' 35 If NHTSA were to promulgate an automobile safety standard
that was technologically impossible (for example, "All cars on the road
must be equipped with airbags by three months from today") or grotes-
quely harsh (for example, "Anyone caught driving with his seat belt un-
buckled shall forfeit his car"), most people would expect the courts to
step in, even if the underlying legislation could not be interpreted to fore-
close the issuance of such a rule.3 6
33. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1982).
35. Id. § 706(2)(A).
36. "Abuse-of-discretion review," as the term is used in this comment, means review to deter-
mine whether an agency action should be set aside on a basis other than that the agency miscon-
strued, or might have misconstrued, a statute (or other source of binding law). For an overview of
the types of errors that constitute abuses of discretion, see Restatement Report, supra note 18, at
253-60. Although this type of review was originally rationalized on the ground that an unreasonable
agency action was in substance a violation of the statute under which the agency acted, see ICC v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 215 U.S. 452, 470 (1910), that fictional argument should be considered unneces-
sary today. See L. JAFFE, supra note 14, at 263-66. Legislative authorization for abuse-of-discretion
review, if considered essential, can be found in section 706(2)(A) of the APA. That authorization
disappears, of course, where the regulatory scheme affirmatively disallows review of the agency's
reasoning process. See, eg., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285 (1978) (Clean
Air Act precludes abuse-of-discretion review of certain emission standards during enforcement
proceedings).
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While apparently willing to accept that type of abuse-of-discretion
review, 37 Judge Smith warns against another type-judicial intervention
based on asserted deficiencies in an agency's reasoning process. In his
view, "[t]here is no bright line between a judicial challenge to an agency's
reasoning-given that the agency does not purport to be engaged in a
decision of logic-and a court's 'substi[tution of] its judgment for that of
the agency.' -31 He illustrates his warning with the agency decision over-
turned in State Farm, which was not remotely as egregious as the hypo-
thetical rules described in the preceding paragraph. Judge Smith draws
attention to the Court's remark in that case that an agency issuing a rule
"must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation
for its action." 39 This language, he points out, "is itself so broad a stan-
dard that it can be used.., to intrude into the realm of legitimate discre-
tionary agency decisionmaking."'4
Judge Smith's underlying concerns are valid. Courts surely have an
obligation to exercise considerable restraint when they review an agency
action for abuse of discretion. By definition, such review entails an ex-
amination of policymaking that Congress has entrusted primarily to the
agency. The great question posed by abuse-of-discretion review is
whether courts can successfully accommodate these concerns while also
trying to upgrade the "rationality" of administrative decisionmaking.
The general strategy the courts have adopted is to articulate some fairly
lenient requirements that are designed to intercept the most blatantly ir-
rational agency decisions-ones that fail to display even minimal regard
for facts, logic, agency precedent, etc.
State Farm, Judge Smith's principal example of overly intrusive re-
view, demonstrates this strategy at work. The point that emerged as cru-
cial in State Farm was that NHTSA, in promulgating its original passive
restraints rule in 1977, had found both airbags and automatic seatbelts to
be workable and cost-effective methods of saving lives on the highways.41
In its 1981 order rescinding that rule, NHTSA declared that the "detach-
able" seatbelt then favored by auto manufacturers would be ineffective.
It did not discuss the effectiveness of airbags at all, however, and its com-
ments on the "nondetachable" seatbelts that it had endorsed four years
37. See Smith, supra note 1, at 454 (apparently condoning reversal of "egregiously" arbitrary
acts).
38. Id. (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43).
39. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
40. Smith, supra note 1, at 454.
41. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 35 (referring to NHT5A's 1977 estimate that passive restraints
could prevent 12,000 deaths and 100,000 serious injuries annually, 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289, 34,298
(1977)).
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earlier were limited to three cursory paragraphs of analysis. 42 In holding
the rescission invalid, the Court unanimously concluded that, in view of
NHTSA's earlier approval of the airbag and nondetachable seatbelt op-
tions, the agency should at least explain why it was now taking action
that in effect treated those options as worse than doing nothing.43
Thus, even though State Farm did, as Judge Smith noted, call in
general terms for "satisfactory explanation[s]" of agency rules,44 the
holding and specific rationale of the case do not commit the Court to
supporting the broadest possible applications of that language. Nor did
the Court squarely adopt the principle, advanced in some earlier deci-
sions in lower courts, 45 that an agency may not adopt a new policy with-
out careful examination of all significant alternatives.46 Precision in
stating the scope of the Court's holding is worthwhile, because the duty
that the unanimous Court did recognize-a duty to explain departures
from the agency's own prior views-is much more manageable than the
broader formulations just mentioned.47 The precise holding conveys to
agencies a relatively clear message about what is expected from them,
and it permits courts to exercise some supervision over one species of
potentially arbitrary action without having to resort to overt substitution
42. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419, 53,421-22 (1981).
43. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46-51, 55-57. Five Justices also concluded that NHTSA's belief
in the ineffectiveness of detachable belts was unsupported by the record. Id. at 51-55. This was the
only holding with which the dissenters disagreed. See id. at 57-58 (Rehnquist, I., dissenting).
44. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
45. See, eg., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1426
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Action on Smoking & Health v. CAB, 699 F.2d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Pillai
v. CAB, 485 F.2d 1018, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
46. The District of Columbia Circuit has suggested that the Court did impose a general require-
ment that alternatives must be evaluated. See ILGWU v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 817 (D.C. Cir.
1983) ("reasoned decisionmaking" mandated by State Farm necessitates consideration of reasonable
alternatives, although not of uncommon or unknown alternatives), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984).
I believe that the Court explicitly declined to require this:
Nor do we broadly require an agency to consider all policy alternatives in reaching deci-
sion.... [Tihe airbag is more than a policy alternative to the passive restraint Standard; it
is a technological alternative within the ambit of the existing Standard. We hold only that
given the judgment made in 1977 that airbags are an effective and cost-beneficial lifesaving
technology, the mandatory passive-restraint rule may not be abandoned without any con-
sideration whatsoever of an airbags-only requirement.
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51. On the other hand, nothing in the Court's opinion prohibits the D.C.
Circuit from adhering to its prior case law requiring consideration of alternatives, as indeed it has
done. See Walter 0. Boswell Memorial Hosp. v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Farmers
Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1511 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 507
(1984); ILGWU v. Donovan, 722 F.2d at 815-18. Other circuits have not yet explicitly embraced this
requirement.
47. Cf Brae Corp. v. United States, 740 F.2d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (State Farm test
does not entail "heightened scrutiny" but is simply a variation on familiar abuse-of-discretion analy-
sis), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2149 (1985); Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407, 417
n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (similar), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984).
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of judicial for executive value judgments.48
Judge Smith overstates his case, therefore, when he depicts review-
ing courts as inevitably turning into "arbiters ... of agency policy direc-
tion."49 It is true enough that there is "no bright line" between abuse-of-
discretion review and outright displacement of the agency's discretion.
Careless or overbroad articulation of the applicable standards of review
may well have fostered improper intrusions, as Judge Smith believes.50
But contemporary abuse-of-discretion doctrine has been taking shape for
only about fifteen years,51 and the Supreme Court has been proceeding
48. Judge Smith sees little reason why the Court should have demanded an explanation for the
agency's change in view: It is "as if the Administration was not fully aware that it was overturning
the previous policy." Smith, supra note 1, at 453-54. To understand this acid remark, a bit of
history is necessary. Originally, the duty to explain departures from prior policy was defended as a
way of making sure that the agency itself had thought about what it was doing: "An agency's view
of what is in the public interest may change, either with or without a change in circumstances. But
an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and
standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored .... Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per Leventhal, J.) (footnotes omitted), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). More recently, however, abuse-of-discretion doctrine has come to be
viewed as having an additional, more substantive dimension. This change in emphasis has been
described as a shift from the "agency hard look," see id. at 853, towards a "judicial hard look." See
National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451-52 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Garland, supra note 27,
at 525-45. Significantly, when the Court in State Farm quoted the above language from Greater
Boston, it deleted the last portion ("deliberately changed, not casually ignored") of Judge
Leventhal's remark, thus avoiding any implication that an agency's abandonment of prior policy is
legitimate whenever it occurs "deliberately." 463 U.S. at 57.
49. Smith, supra note 1, at 452; see also id. at 456 ("[Wlhen [agencies] come up with decisions
significant elements of the society do not like, we shift the decisions to judicial bodies ....") (empha-
sis added).
In a similar vein, Judge Smith argues that a court acquires "at least temporary control over
substantive policy" when it remands an administrative decision because of deficiencies in the reason-
ing supporting the action. Id. at 454 (emphasis added). The criticism does not cut very deep, be-
cause "control" in this sense temporarily shifts when a court remands an administrative decision for
any reason at all. This truism should not distract attention from the central issue: to decide what
principles ought to govern substantive judicial review of administrative action. When the courts are
applying proper standards of review, administrators who lose "control" over policy have only them-
selves to blame.
50. The ABA Administrative Law Section recognized in its restatement of scope-of-review doc-
trine that the case law currently allows a court to set aside an agency action that "fails ... to rest
upon reasoned decisionmaking." Restatement Report, supra note 18, at 259-60. Because some law-
yers commenting on early drafts expressed concern about this open-ended ground of decision, how-
ever, the accompanying report included an explicit warning that the restatement's recognition of this
line of authority "is not intended to imply a firm endorsement of it." Id. at 260. Strictly speaking,
this disclaimer was superfluous, since the entire restatement was designed to be basically descriptive,
but even superfluity can convey a message.
51. A convenient measuring point for the beginning of the hard look doctrine is the nearly
simultaneous appearance of three important decisions: Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); and Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 923 (1971).
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with the utmost caution. Indeed, what may be most noteworthy about
State Farm is that it was atypical; it was apparently the first time in a
decade that the Court had used a pure abuse-of-discretion rationale to
strike down a federal agency's decision.52 Consequently, it is far too
early to conclude that judicial scrutiny of the reasons agencies give for
their discretionary choices has proved unworkable. Instead, the search
for moderate, durable scope-of-review principles should continue.
II. THE DEMOCRACY ISSUE
As I have discussed, Judge Smith's contention that the modem judi-
cial hard look unduly restricts agency discretion stems largely from an
oversimplified formal model of the courts' capabilities. But his doubts
about the courts' capabilities are not the only basis for his discontent. He
also believes that active judicial review of "decisions of will" corrodes the
democratic process.5 3 In this section of the comment, I will respond to
this branch of his analysis.
Judge Smith's discussion of the tension between judicial review and
democracy is not the account that one might have expected. According
to the usual description of this tension, courts interfere too readily with
the policies of Congress, either by misconstruing statutes or by wrongly
holding them unconstitutional. But that familiar complaint of disgrun-
tled politicians and acerbic commentators is not the point Judge Smith
wishes to make. Rather, he fears that the very existence of vigorous judi-
cial review of agency actions deters Congress from reaching policy deci-
sions in the first place. He argues that legislators, when asked to make
difficult choices between conflicting social goals, are prone to take the
easy way out by delegating to administrative agencies. They can thereby
claim credit for "doing something" about the problem, without later hav-
ing to take the blame for the agency's concrete decision. Recognizing
that the courts will closely scrutinize the agency's actions, legislators are
content to allow the supposedly nonpolitical judiciary to make decisions
52. In this comment's usage, as discussed supra note 36, an abuse-of-discretion reversal occurs
when a court sets aside an agency action without concluding that the agency misunderstood the law.
Before State Farm, the most recent Supreme Court case using pure abuse-of-discretion reasoning to
invalidate an agency action was Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 806-
17 (1973) (agency failed to articulate reasoned justification for departure from prior policies). Even
in that case, it was unclear whether the lead opinion spoke for a majority of the Court. See id. at
826 (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting).
One additional abuse-of-discretion reversal has come down since State Farm. Again, however,
only a plurality of Justices joined the lead opinion. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct.
2101, 2114-17, 2121-22 (1986) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (striking down "Baby Doe" rules, primarily
because of lack of factual support for government's theories). The swing voter, Chief Justice Burger,
concurred in the result without opinion. Id. at 2123.
53. See Smith, supra note 1, at 446.
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that Congress should have made.54
Judge Smith's view that delegation is at least partly a congressional
blame-avoiding strategy is echoed by many other observers 55 and is espe-
cially prominent in the modem "public choice" literature. 56 For the sake
of discussion we may take this view as true and further assume, as its
proponents generally do, that Congress's fondness for delegation should
be deplored (although that proposition is by no means self-evident).5 7
Even if these premises are accepted, they do not support Judge Smith's
conclusion that courts are reviewing "decisions of will" too actively.
Judge Smith's diagnosis of congressional behavior might warrant
some reduction in hard look review if such a reduction would be likely to
cause Congress to make more policy decisions on its own. This seems
fairly unlikely, however. Even if judicial review became less intrusive,
most of the factors that now lead Congress to delegate authority would
continue to exert their influence. These include the tremendous volume
of services that our society wants government to provide; the real or
54. Id. at 455-56. Judge Smith also contends that administrative law interferes with democ-
racy by enticing the public into believing that procedure is more important than substance. Ab-
sorbed with the question whether due process was observed, society refrains from seriously
evaluating whether regulators' choices conform to our political and moral heritage. See id. at 429,
456, 465. Although the "procedural" aspect of "judicialization," see supra text accompanying notes
2-3, may be vulnerable to this criticism, activist judicial review surely is not. Rather, it induces
officials and litigants to focus more attentively on the substantive merits of agency policies.
55. See, eg., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (calling Congress's delegation in that case an "obvious example of
Congress simply avoiding a choice which was both fundamental... and yet so politically divisive
that the necessary decision or compromise was difficult, if not impossible, to hammer out in the
legislative forge."); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-32 (1980); Wiltse, The Representative
Function of Bureaucracy, 35 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 510, 514-15 (1941).
56. See, eg., M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 48-
49 (1977); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 56-62 (1982); Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative
Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 46-52 (1982).
57. In a valuable recent article, Jerry L. Mashaw questions the conventional belief that delega-
tions by Congress should be viewed with suspicion. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 81 (1985). Although his treatment
is too extensive for a full summary here, the contention that may be most relevant to the present
discussion is that delegations do not actually interfere with legislative accountability. Mashaw ar-
gues that the decision to delegate is itself a choice for which legislators could be held accountable if
the electorate really objected to it. Id. at 87. Moreover, voters are more likely to care about their
representative's general ideological tendencies than about a specific issue position that the represen-
tative would have taken if there had- been no delegation. Id. at 87-88; see also infra note 77.
This is not to say that Judge Smith's attitude should be dismissed entirely. Undoubtedly, many
people are attracted to the notion that Congress should, whenever possible, make fundamental regu-
latory decisions on its own. In some abstract sense, our governmental system is "supposed" to work
that way. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Mashaw's article does establish, however, that the disfavored
status of delegation deserves more careful consideration than it usually receives.
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imagined benefits of leaving that work to experienced and technically so-
phisticated "experts"; and the desire to establish programs that can be
flexibly administered in differing settings across the nation.58 Even the
blame-avoiding strategy described by Judge Smith would not necessarily
lose its attraction: Congress could merely start blaming courts less fre-
quently and agencies more frequently. In short, a new regime of judicial
deference would probably not cause Congress to cease delegating author-
ity broadly. It would more likely result in a greater concentration of
delegated authority in the hands of administrative officials who them-
selves have no electoral mandate. Shifting power from unelected judges
to unelected bureaucrats does not sound like an effective way to enhance
democratic control over social policy.
The reasoning just offered is incomplete, however. Implicit in Judge
Smith's discussion may be a notion that intrusive judicial review also
subverts the democratic process in a second way-not only by encourag-
ing Congress to avoid difficult policy choices, but also by hampering the
exercise of political judgment by the executive branch. After all, the ex-
ecutive agencies work closely with the White House and answer directly
to it.59 In recent years, moreover, their major proposed rules have been
intensively examined by the Office of Management and Budget, which is
committed to advancing the President's political agenda.60 These ties to
the President make it likely that agencies will be more closely attuned to
public sentiment than the "isolated" judiciary can be. It is fairly argua-
ble, therefore, that the courts' standards of review should be lenient, so
that agencies will be able to adopt policies the public wants. In the past
few years, judicial deference has increasingly been promoted as a means
of allowing an incumbent administration to act on the views that may
have led the citizenry to elect it.61 This argument unquestionably has a
58. See generally J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 6-46 (1938); Breyer, The Legisla.
tive Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 788 (1984) ("Congress delegated broadly to the agencies
because it had to do so."); Mashaw, supra note 57, at 91-99.
59. "Independent" agencies are not supervised by the White House in the same way that execu-
tive agencies are, but their heads are often selected by the President for appointment because of the
specific policies they would want to implement while in office.
60. See Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 92
(Supp. III 1985); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
431-34 (1982); DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1075 (1986); Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write
a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986).
61. See, ag., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984); State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting); Sierra Club v. Costle,
657 F.2d 298, 405-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 AD. L. REV. v (Summer
1982). But cf National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 775 F.2d 342, 356 n.17 (D.C. Cir 1985)
("While an agency may properly rely on an 'incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
270 [Vol. 1986:258
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good deal of force.62
Yet the interplay between judicial review and democracy should not
be oversimplified. As a counterpoint to Judge Smith's plea for judicial
restraint, I shall argue that, in certain ways, hard look review can actu-
ally strengthen the representativeness of modem government. It does
this by helping to keep the executive branch accountable to other actors
in the political system, namely Congress and the voting public.
Judicial review for errors of law promotes accountability by enforc-
ing statutes that are themselves the products of a majoritarian process.
For example, in the 1966 traffic safety legislation, as later construed by
the Supreme Court,63 the people decided through their elected represent-
atives that NHTSA should treat safety as the paramount consideration
when writing motor vehicle standards. That a new conservative majority
elected Ronald Reagan in 1980 should be relevant in the later adminis-
tration of the statute, but only up to a point. It would be a legitimate
basis for the exercise of discretion within the statutory framework. It
would not, however, justify Reagan's NHTSA in issuing a rule predi-
cated on the assumption that the goal of safety is less important than the
financial health of the automobile industry. Judicial invalidation of such
a rule would not be antidemocratic, but rather a vindication of the ex-
pressed will of the 1966 majority.
Judicial review for abuse of discretion can bolster the democratic
process in a different way. It can foster informed political dialogue by
counteracting the bureaucratic tendency to shy away from controversy.
By reversing agency actions that are supported by blatantly weak reason-
ing, reviewing courts can force an agency to state its case fairly to the
public and be judged thereon. 64 To return to the State Farm example,
NHTSA evidently attempted to minimize public opposition to its deci-
sion by asserting that effective passenger protection simply could not, as
far as it knew, be achieved through a passive restraints rule. But when
the courts made clear that this neutral-sounding explanation was incredi-
ble (because of the suspicious paucity of discussion of airbags and
nondetachable belts, which had been deemed effective by NHTSA a few
inform its judgments,' [Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865](emphasis added), it may not casually substitute
those considerations for a rational evaluation of the merits and efficacy of its policies.").
62. Two commentators who are generally sympathetic towards hard look review have sug-
gested recently that the strengthening of executive oversight might ultimately warrant at least some
narrowing of judicial oversight. See DeLong, New Wine for a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the
Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. RaV. 399, 419 (1986); Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA:
Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 292-95 (1986).
63. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 55.
64. See Garland, supra note 30, at 554-57; Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine,
1983 Sup. Cr. REv. 177, 211.
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years earlier), the agency had to choose between changing its policy and
telling the public more candidly why requiring devices that did work was
nevertheless not in the public interest. Thus, while courts could not de-
vise a passive restraints policy on their own, abuse-of-discretion review
was properly employed to prevent a political choice from being concealed
behind a technocratic facade.65
It might be objected that members of Congress, who possess their
own electoral base, are far better qualified than the courts to monitor and
at times challenge the executive branch's claims to be representing the
popular will. The point is well taken but is not a complete answer. First,
the oversight committees of Congress have limited time and resources.
Although they may be more attentive than is sometimes assumed, 66 they
inevitably will not know much about, or be prepared to do anything
about, some of the policy positions agencies adopt. Judicial review, in
contrast, may normally be invoked by anyone who is harmed by the
agency action in question;67 contacts with well-positioned members of
Congress are not needed. Interestingly, it also appears that Congress
often obtains information for oversight purposes by consulting materials
that the agency has drafted or assembled to meet the requirements of
judicial review.68
Finally, one should not exaggerate how greatly Congress's qualifica-
tions exceed those of the judicial branch. Oversight committees are not
always perfectly representative of Congress as a whole (let alone of the
electorate). It is well known that the rosters of congressional committees
tend to be heavily biased in favor of members whose home districts have
a parochial interest in the committee's business. 69 Furthermore, most of
65. Abuse-of-discretion review cannot always expose concealed motives, because a strong pre-
sumption of regularity usually prevents courts from probing beneath the surface of the written deci-
sion. See, eg., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971);
Restatement Report, supra note 18, at 264-67; see also Murphy, What Reason for the Quest?: A
Response to Professor Scott, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 299, 305-06 (1975) (one official's candid admission
that agency opinion-writers will advance, sincerely or otherwise, any rationale that they think a
court will uphold). Thus, judicial review will be effective only against explanations that are so illogi-
cal, inconsistent, factually unsupported, etc., that they cannot be seriously intended. But even that
much benefit seems valuable.
66. See McCubbins & Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire
Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. Sl. 166 (1984).
67. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
68. McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, The Political Implications of Administrative Procedures, J.L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATION (forthcoming). According to congressional staff members surveyed in a
recent study, government publications and notices are prime sources of oversight information
(although the staffers also mentioned many other sources). Aberbach, The Congressional Committee
Intelligence System, CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY (forthcoming Spring 1987).
69. See, ag., K. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE: DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE AsSIGN-
MENTS IN THE MODERN HOUSE 66-93, 231-32, 259-60 (1978). The Supreme Court's invalidation of
the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), may rest, in part, on a perception that a
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the actual work of oversight is not done by Senators and Representatives,
but by committee staffers, whose political accountability is indirect at
best.70 The uncertain reliability of congressional oversight is particularly
significant when the issue is whether the executive branch has properly
interpreted its statutory mandate. On those issues, the courts are likely
to give a more objective and dependable answer than individual members
or committees of Congress would.71 Consequently, many agency policy
judgments that do not trouble oversight committees will nevertheless
raise serious questions that a court ought to address. 72
To sum up, Judge Smith is right to maintain that one major test of
the efficacy of a regulatory system is whether it is able to honor the policy
preferences of the voting majority.73 This goal presumably should not be
pursued to the complete exclusion of other goals, such as stability, effi-
ciency, and evenhandedness, but its claims are impossible to overlook.
Nevertheless, judicial passivity is not always the way to further it. The
problem brings to mind a remark from Judge Leventhal's well-known
concurring opinion in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA:74 "Congress has been willing
to delegate its legislative powers broadly... because there is court review
to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory
limits, and that it fleshes out objectives within those limits by an adminis-
tration that is not irrational or discriminatory. ' 75 He thus perceived the
same cause-and-effect relationship that Judge Smith does.76 Unlike
Judge Smith, however, he did not conclude from it that courts should
limit their review in a (probably futile) effort to coerce Congress into
subset of Congress cannot be trusted to act as the whole body would. See Bruff, supra note 31, at
213-22.
70. See Hill, The Third House of Congress Versus the Fourth Branch of Government: The Im-
pact of Congressional Committee Staff on Agency Regulatory Decision-Making, 19 J. MAR. L. REV.
247 (1986).
71. Cf Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68
VA. L. REv. 253 (1982).
Congress is far better suited for policy review of rules than for legal review, and probably
engages in the former even when its [response] comes clothed in the language of the latter.
The views of later legislators as to the intent of earlier Congresses are too easily colored by
subsequent developments that were not even remotely within contemplation at the time of
passage. For similar reasons, courts, when construing statutes, traditionally have viewed
post-enactment statements by legislators or committees as poor indicators of the original
statutory intent.
Id. at 277-78 n.69 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
72. Cf D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (admonish-
ing Secretary of Transportation that he must, in deciding whether to approve bridge route, consider
only statutorily relevantfactors, instead of simply acceding to irrelevant demands of influential con-
gressional committee chairman), cerL denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
73. See, eg., Smith, supra note 1, at 449.
74. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
75. Id. at 68 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
76. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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making more policies itself. He appreciated that statutes conferring
broad discretionary powers are an inescapable reality of modem society
and that the legitimacy of those powers would be seriously weakened
without some judicial participation.77
III. CONCLUSION
This brief response to Judge Smith's critique has probed only a few
comers of the vast topic of judicial review of agency action. Much theo-
retical work remains to be done. At present we do not even have a gener-
ally accepted descriptive model of the courts' current review standards. 78
Still less is there a consensus about the review standards that courts
should use, although the literature already contains some excellent treat-
ments by proponents 79 as well as opponents80 of active judicial review.
But even those observers who would favor a shift backwards, to-
wards greater judicial deference, should question Judge Smith's position
that intrusive judicial review of the merits of agency actions is fundamen-
tally illegitimate, a sign of constitutional crisis. The review standards
that courts apply to routine administrative decisions have not been seri-
ously challenged as constitutionally excessive for at least half a century,8'
77. Cf Mashaw, supra note 57, at 93, 99 (judicial requirements of rationality help make dele-
gations of authority desirable).
78. The ABA Administrative Law Section's "restatement" attempts to fill this gap. See Re-
statement Report, supra note 18.
79. See, eg., Garland, supra note 30; Sunstein, supra note 64; Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard
Look- JudicialActivism and Administrative Law, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL'Y 51 (1984).
80. See, ag., McGarity, Judicial Review of Scientific Rulemaking, Sci., TECH. & HUMAN VAL-
uES, Winter 1984, at 97; Scalia, supra note 61; Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3
YALE J. REG. 283 (1986).
81. What constitutional law exists on the subject of excessive judicial review of agency decisions
emerges most clearly from a pair of cases involving the Federal Radio Commission, the predecessor
of the FCC. The Radio Act of 1927 authorized the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit to revise the Commission's decisions in any manner it considered just. Federal Radio
Comm'n v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464, 467 (1930). The Supreme Court held that this broad
revisory power was "administrative" rather than "judicial" and refused to take appellate jurisdiction
in a case arising under the Act. Id. at 469-70. Congress responded to General Electric by amending
the statute to permit a reviewing court merely to consider whether the agency had made an error of
law, whether the findings were supported by substantial evidence, and whether the findings were
arbitrary or capricious. In Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S.
266, 274-78 (1933), the Supreme Court pronounced all of these inquiries "judicial" and held that the
problems noted in General Electric had been cured. See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 29.10, at 180-83 (lst ed. 1958). Since then, this branch of constitutional law has been
essentially quiescent. Compare Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (upholding without
opinion judge's approval of consent decree dismantling AT&T) with id. at 1004-06 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (expressing concern that the statute authorizing the district court to review antitrust
settlement agreements might exceed article III limits on the judicial power).
To some degree, the legacy of General Electric survives in the general rule that when a court
finds an administrative action unlawful, it must remand the action to the agency for reconsideration,
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and one doubts that the Supreme Court would reopen that line of inquiry
today. 82 In any event, Judge Smith has not convincingly supported his
thesis that courts must refrain from any serious review of "decisions of
will." Although the courts will never be a match for the executive in
political decisionmaking, it is unrealistic to propose to exclude them
entirely.
Despite some weaknesses in his arguments, however, Judge Smith's
somber conclusion that judicial review has lost its moorings should not
be put out of mind too readily. Existing standards of review call for a
great deal of sophistication and prudential judgment in their application.
Whatever one thinks of the courts' recent performance, it would be all
too easy for tomorrow's judges to drift inadvertently into either abdica-
tion of meaningful review or usurpation of legitimate administrative dis-
cretion. As an old aphorism runs, "[t]he optimist proclaims that we live
in the best of all possible worlds; and the pessimist fears this is true."' 83
To avoid confirming Judge Smith's pessimistic forecast, both courts and
commentators will need to be on their guard against complacency in the
years ahead.
instead of simply revising the agency's decision as the court deems best. See, e.g., NLRB v. Food
Store Employees Local 347, 417 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1974); Federal Power Comm'n v. Idaho Power Co.,
344 U.S. 17, 20-21 (1952); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 145-46 (1940). To this
extent, Judge Smith is correct in saying that courts "must always be instruments of restraint [instead
of creativity)." See Smith, supra note 1, at 445. But this rule restricts only judicial remedies, not
the review standards by which the legality of "decisions of will" will be determined. Even as a
remedial principle, moreover, it has its exceptions. See Garland, supra note 30, at 562-75 (noting,
for example, recent cases in which courts have ordered agencies to take statutorily mandated affirm-
ative acts).
82. If anything, the live constitutional issue today is whether the courts' review in certain types
of cases is sufficiently intensive to satisfy article III. See generally Monaghan, Constitutional Fact
Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 247-59 (1985).
83. J. CABELL, THE SILVER STALLION 112 (1926).
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